Economic and social disruptions of the COVID-19 pandemic have important implications for gender and class inequality. Drawing on Statistics Canada’s monthly Labour Force Survey, we document trends in gender gaps in employment and work hours over the pandemic. Our findings highlight the importance of care provisions for gender equity, with gaps larger among parents than people without children, and most pronounced when care and employment were more difficult to reconcile. When employment barriers eased, so did the gender–employment gap. The pandemic (...) could not undo longer-standing cultural and structural shifts motivating contemporary mothers’ employment. The pandemic also exacerbated educational inequalities among women, highlighting the importance of assessing gendered impacts through an intersectional lens. (shrink)

A systematic working out of the basic concepts of phenomenological psychology through an interdisciplinary synthesis of gestalt psychology and existential phenomenological thought.

A standard norm of reaction (NoR) is a graphical depiction of the phenotypic value of some trait of an individual genotype in a population as a function of an environmental parameter. NoRs thus depict the phenotypic plasticity of a trait. The topological properties of NoRs for sets of different genotypes can be used to infer the presence of (non-linear) genotype-environment interactions. While it is clear that many NoRs are adaptive, it is not yet settled whether their evolutionary etiology should be (...) explained by selection on the mean phenotypic trait values in different environments or whether there are specific genes conferring plasticity. If the second alternative is true the NoR is itself an object of selection. Generalized NoRs depict plasticity at the level of populations or subspecies within a species, species within a genus, or taxa at higher levels. Historically, generalized NoRs have routinely been drawn though rarely explicitly recognized as such. Such generalized NoRs can be used to make evolutionary inferences at higher taxonomic levels in a way analagous to how standard NoRs are used for microevolutionary inferences. (shrink)

Lang, B. Philosophy and the manners of art.--Hofstadter, A. Freedom, enownment, and philosophy.--Mehta, J. L. A stranger from Asia.--Fox, D. A. A passage past India.--Rucker, D. Philosophy and the constitution of Emerson's world.--Schneider, H. W. The pragmatic movement in historical perspective.--Barnes, H. E. Reflections on myth and magic.--Cauvel, J. The imperious presence of theater.--Seay, A. Musical conservatism in the fourteenth century.--Hochman, W. R. The enduring fascination of war.--Davenport, M. M. J. Glenn Gray and the promise of wisdom.

Emotion regulation (i.e. either up- or down-regulating affective responses to emotional stimuli) has been shown to modulate long-term emotional memory formation. Further, research has demonstrated that the emotional aspects of scenes are preferentially remembered relative to neutral aspects (known as the emotional memory trade-off effect). This trade-off is often enhanced when sleep follows learning, compared to an equivalent period of time spent awake. However, the interactive effects of sleep and emotion regulation on emotional memory are poorly understood. We presented 87 (...) participants with pictures of neutral or negative objects on neutral backgrounds paired with instructions to either increase or decrease their emotional response by altering personal relevance, or to passively view the stimuli. Following a 12 h period of sleep or wakefulness, participants were tested for their memory of objects and backgrounds separately. Although we replicated the emotional memory trade-off effect, no differences in the magnitude of the trade-off effect were observed between regulation conditions. Sleep improved all aspects of memory, but it did not preferentially benefit memory for emotional components of scenes. Irrespective of a period of sleep or wake following encoding, findings suggest emotion regulation during encoding did not influence memory for emotional items at a 12-hour delay. (shrink)

Healthcare ethics consultation is therefore one of the most consequential, institutionally accepted, and widespread forms of public philosophy in the United States. In this chapter, the authors begin with an overview of the development of healthcare ethics and its emergence as a concrete practice embedded in healthcare settings. They then describe the core ethical principles that inform the everyday practice of ethics consultations and the generally accepted steps involved in conducting a consultation. The authors discuss the role of clinical ethicists (...) in medical education and policy development. Finally, they conclude with some remarks on the distinctive contributions made by those with philosophical training to these endeavors and the importance of continued engagement by philosophers in this important public work. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that a principal argument in favor of the existence of non-conceptual content (henceforth NCC) fails. That is, I do not accept that considerations regarding the richness of our perceptual experiences support the existence of NCC. I argue instead that the existence of NCC is empirically motivated. Here is an outline of the paper. First, I set out the distinction between conceptual content and NCC as we understand it. Second, I consider the richness argument (RA), and (...) argue that it fails. I argue in particular that RA (or RA-style arguments) are either self-defeating or confl ict with reasonably established accounts of early perceptual processing. Third, I tackle a residual phenomenological puzzle and offer a solution to it. Fourth, I argue that the existence of NCC enjoys empirical support. I argue in particular that states associated with early stages of visual perceptual processing have NCC. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 11, November 2019, Page 48-49.

This article considers the research ethics appropriate to Paul Feyerabend’s notorious ‘methodological anarchist’ approach to the history and philosophy of science, concluding that it might be especially appropriate for our ‘post-truth’ times. The article begins by noting that Feyerabend favorite historical figure, Galileo, appears Janus-faced in his corpus. The article focuses on the positive image of someone who broke institutionalized rules of inquiry in pursuit of a ‘higher truth’ that was fully realized by Newton and his successors. The logic of (...) Galileo’s early seventeenth century situation was that decisions about permissible forms of inquiry and inference were based on mixed political and epistemic criteria – and that this was known, and sometimes admitted, by all parties. Galileo played with this ambiguity to some but by no means complete success, largely because he could not properly ground his ‘higher truth’. The article proceeds to show that Galileo’s situation was not unique but commonplace in the history of science, a point that has become clearer since the rise of archival historical research in the nineteenth century. Moreover, the institutional incentives to commit, cover up and detect what we now call ‘research fraud’ have been very uneven. Most such fraud has probably passed undetected sufficiently long to be incorporated in the body of accepted scientific knowledge. In recent years, however, increased attention has been given to research fraud due to the increased existential and financial stakes involved, which in turn have contributed to science’s larger legitimacy crisis in the post-truth era. The article ends on a Feyerabendian note, suggesting that research findings should include sunset clauses and statues of limitations. (shrink)

This chapter considers several dimensions of humanity’s “in-betweenness,” starting from the historical roots of the idea in Western theology, philosophy, and science. A fundamental distinction is highlighted between “human” as a continuous property and as a discrete entity. The former focuses on the human as a state of being into and out of which something might pass, whereas the latter focuses on being human as a state that something is or is not at a given moment. Both conceptualizations of the (...) human bear on the construction and significance of the Turing Test, which aims to distinguish a human from a computer simply based on responses to questions posed by a human. Usually, the Turing Test is seen as selecting the computer as non-human, but it may be redeployed to select the computer as human. This latter prospect is dubbed “Turing Test 2.0” and explored in the rest of the chapter, especially in terms of the figure of the cyborg, which has passed from cybernetics through science fiction to the lived experience of an increasing number of beings. Implied in Turing Test 2.0 is “judgement” on how a candidate might count as human. Here, foundational questions about the ontology of art are applied to understand the requisite sense of judgement involved. In the modern period, these have tended to undermine any strong connection between a work’s origin and its value. In the spirit of Turing Test 2.0, they oppose “cishumanity,” namely, the notion that one must be born human to be human. (shrink)

In a number of places over the last few years Hayden White has attacked a view of history which I shall call the common-sense position and which runs as follows. Although moral and aesthetic assessments play some role in the writing of history, historians are to a large extent concerned with making true statements about the past and with giving correct explanations pf past events, and these central activities can and ought to be assessed by empirical standards, which on the (...) whole are not dissimilar to those employed in the sciences. For White, historical accounts are more like literary fictions than like scientific accounts. They are to be assessed ultimately by appeal to pragmatic, moral, and aesthetic considerations rather than to empirical ones. My aim in this paper is mainly critical. I shall examine a number of claims and arguments which White puts forward in opposition to the common-sense position and argue that they do nothing to undermine it. I shall concentrate mainly on his article "The Historical Text as a Literary Artifact" (in Clio, Vol. Ill, No. 3, June, 1974), although I shall be making some reference to his book Metahistory (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1973). (shrink)

The various versions of salvation in the New Testament have a prior unity in the event of the cross of Jesus Christ.

I respond to Rupert Read's highly critical review of my Kuhn vs Popper: The Struggle for the Soul Science . In contrast to my pro-Popper take on the debate, Read promotes a Wittgenstein-inflected Kuhn, whom I dub "Kuhnenstein." Kuhnenstein is largely the figment of Read's—and others'—fertile philosophical imagination as channeled through scholastic philosophical practice. Contra Read, I argue that Kuhnenstein provides not only a poor basis for social epistemology but Kuhnenstein's prominence itself exemplifies a poor social epistemology for philosophy. Nevertheless, (...) like Read, I wish to speak in favor of amateurism in philosophy; for me, the exemplar is the dialectical Popper rather than the gnomic and dogmatic Kuhnenstein. Key Words: Kuhnenstein • social epistemology • Kuhn • Popper • Wittgenstein • skepticism • language therapy • amateurism. (shrink)

Comienzo examinando algunas pistas, en gran medida falsas, que se han seguido desde los griegos para definir la naturaleza de la ciudadanía científica en una democracia. Sin embargo, el linaje que va desde Platón al positivismo proporciona un contexto útil para entender la evolución de la concepción moderna de conocimiento experto y de los diferentes problemas que éste plantea a las democracias modernas. Estos problemas giran en torno a las cuestiones de la institucionalización —en concreto, a cómo diseñar instituciones que (...) respeten la idea de conocimiento como un principio de orden social sin caer en el gobierno del conocimiento experto—. Después de analizar dos recientes propuestas alemanas que siguen estas líneas, defiendo la institucionalización de las «conferencias de consenso», o jurados de ciudadanos. Finalmente, considero alguna de las implicaciones epistemológicas sociales más generales del papel del «ciudadano científico». (shrink)

The scarcity of human organs requires the transplant community to make difficult allocation decisions. This process begins at individual medical centers, where transplant teams decide which patients to place on the transplant waiting list. Each transplant center utilizes its own listing criteria to determine if a patient is eligible for transplantation. These criteria have historically considered preexisting affective and psychotic disorders to be relative or absolute contraindications to transplantation. While attitudes within the field appear to be moving away from this (...) practice, there is no data to confirm that eligibility criteria have changed. There are no nationwide guidelines detailing the manner in which affective and psychotic disorders should impact transplant eligibility. Individual transplant centers thus form their own transplant eligibility criteria, resulting in significant inter-institution variability. Data from the 1990s indicates that the majority of transplant programs considered certain psychiatric illnesses, such as active schizophrenia, to be absolute contraindications to transplantation. A review of literature reveals that no comprehensive data has been collected on the topic since that time. Furthermore, the limited data available about current practices suggests that psychiatric illness continues to be viewed as a contraindication to transplantation at some transplant centers. In light of this finding, we review psychiatric literature that examines the impact of affective and psychotic disorders on transplant outcomes and conclude that the presence of these disorders is not an accurate predictor of transplant success. We then discuss the requirements of justice as they relate to the creation of a just organ allocation system. We conclude that transplant eligibility criteria that exclude patients with affective and psychotic disorders on the basis of their psychiatric diagnosis alone are unjust. Just listing criteria must incorporate only those factors that have a causative effect on posttransplant morbidity and mortality. Justice also demands that we eliminate current inter-institution practice variations in favor of national transplant eligibility criteria. Given the limited data available about current practices, we call for an updated study investigating the manner in which affect and psychotic disorders impact transplant eligibility determinations. (shrink)

I. Introduction, notes, and appendix -- II. A facsimile of the first edition, 1642, reduced in size.

Altruistic self-sacrifice is rare, supererogatory, and not to be expected of any rational agent; but, the possibility of giving up one's life for the common good has played an important role in moral theorizing. For example, Judith Jarvis Thomson (2008) has argued in a recent paper that intuitions about altruistic self-sacrifice suggest that something has gone wrong in philosophical debates over the trolley problem. We begin by showing that her arguments face a series of significant philosophical objections; however, our project (...) is as much constructive as critical. Building on Thomson's philosophical argument, we report the results of a study that was designed to examine commonsense intuitions about altruistic self-sacrifice. We find that a surprisingly high proportion of people judge that they should give up their lives to save a small number of unknown strangers. We also find that the willingness to engage in such altruistic self-sacrifice is predicted by a person's religious commitments. Finally, we show that folk-moral judgments are sensitive to agent-relative reasons in a way that diverges in important ways from Thomson's proposed intuitions about the trolley problem. With this in mind, we close with a discussion of the relative merits of folk intuitions and philosophical intuitions in constructing a viable moral theory. (shrink)